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On Strategic Foundations

Analogical Thinking: The Sine Qua Non
for Using History Well
Richard A. Lacquement Jr.
ABSTRACT: This article discusses the use of historical analogies as
one of humanity’s most important adaptive techniques. Recognizable
patterns enable us to clarify context and provide guides for our
actions when facing unfamiliar intellectual terrain. Thoughtful
strategists should, however, be mindful of the substantial drawbacks
associated with using analogies as sources for prescribed action
amidst a constellation of contingent circumstances.

T

he use of historical analogies is one of humanity’s most
important adaptive techniques. Our ability to learn from our
own and others’ experiences to guide our judgment for future
action is central to progress. To reason by analogy is to draw insights
from two or more similar situations to speculate about other potentially
corresponding respects. Historical analogies infer similar events may agree
in some respects despite occurring in different periods.1 Confronting the
unknown, people grasp for recognizable patterns from past experiences
to clarify context and provide hypotheses for subsequent choices and
behaviors. Reasoning by analogy helps us make sense of the world.
Analogies are inviting because they offer great promise for cutting paths
through unfamiliar intellectual terrain.
As comprehensive guides to action, however, analogies are severely
limited. Thoughtful strategists must be mindful of the natural appeal
and value of analogies. Especially during the early stages of confronting
new or mysterious challenges, strategists must recognize the substantial
drawbacks of using analogies to prescribe action amidst constellations of
contingent circumstances that rarely, if ever replicate perfectly.

History and Experience

Personal history and experience are valuable components of
individual theories of how the world works. In that regard, Sir Michael
Howard provides an evocative metaphor for some key challenges
soldiers face.
My thanks to Tami Davis Biddle for her insights on decision-making in stressful situations and
Stephen J. Gerras for his perspective on self-awareness and team thinking, as well as Conrad C.
Crane, Michael S. Neiberg, anonymous reviewers, and panel attendees at the International Studies
Association and Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society conferences for commenting
on earlier drafts of this article.
1      Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of
1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 6–7; and David Hackett Fischer, Historians’
Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
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A soldier . . . in peacetime is like a sailor navigating by dead reckoning.
You have left the terra firma of the last war and are extrapolating from
the experiences of that war. The greater the distance from the last war,
the greater become the chances of error in this extrapolation. Occasionally
there is a break in the clouds: a small-scale conflict occurs somewhere and
gives you a “fix” by showing whether certain weapons and techniques are
effective or not; but it is always a doubtful fix. . . . For the most part you have
to sail on in a fog of peace until at the last moment. Then, probably when
it is too late, the clouds lift and there is land immediately ahead; breakers,
probably, and rocks. Then you find out rather late in the day whether your
calculations have been right or not.2

Mindfulness of the “fog of peace” should extend to our
understanding of how cloudy our view remains even as we seek clarity
in historical experiences.
How and why individuals and groups choose analogies for national
security applications are important questions that draw upon history
and psychology. For national security professionals, using history
well, particularly when it intersects with professional experiences, is
a constant challenge. Meeting this challenge is especially important
in professional military education (PME) where interwoven study of
history and psychology should foster national security professionals’
ability to understand war and to develop sound discretionary judgment.
Historical cases provide natural foundations for analogical thinking
that powerfully enhance security studies. According to Eliot Cohen,
“To study military and strategic history in depth is to acquire vicarious
experience of the variability of warfare, to acquire a certain kind of
flexibility that neither military doctrine nor any individual’s military
experience can supply.” 3 The natural commingling of individuals’
personal, idiosyncratic analogies with the theories, models, and
frameworks that PME programs seek to impart requires close attention
from educators and students alike. Broad, rich, and diverse student and
faculty experiences of professional practice and previous education offer
tremendous benefits in the classroom. But there are also significant
disadvantages—such as students, and sometimes faculty, anchoring
on more readily available personal experiences (especially emotionally
searing ones)—that may inhibit the consideration of less familiar but
more useful possibilities.
As our students mature and gain real world experience, the interplay
between direct (personal) and indirect (educational) experiences
of history increases in scope. The typical career progression from
tactical to operational to strategic assignments has parallel educational
opportunities from junior to intermediate to senior to general/flag
officer PME. Moreover, on each step up the PME ladder, individual
students bring an accumulating portfolio of personal historical
2      Michael Howard, “Military Science in the Age of Peace” Journal of the Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies 119, no. 1 (March 1974): 4, quoted in Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering
Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2002), 1.
3      Eliot A. Cohen, “The Historical Mind and Military Strategy,” Orbis 49, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 584.
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experiences ripe for analogies. The propensity for reasoning by
analogy and the recognition of likely analogy sources deserves close
attention from students and faculty. In the present era, for example,
servicemembers bring personal experiences and assessments of the
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq into the classrooms in ways that
cannot be ignored.
A strategic leader may apply a compelling personal historical analogy
to diagnose and treat a national security issue like a doctor identifies
symptoms, diagnoses conditions, and recommends treatments for health
issues. In 1965, for example, decisions on escalation in Vietnam were
significantly influenced by President Lyndon B. Johnson’s and other
senior leaders’ analogical thinking about momentous events they had
lived through—such as the implications of the Munich Agreement to
the beginning of World War II in Europe (inappropriate appeasement)
and the nature of the American and Chinese clash during the Korean
War (policy overreach and conflict expansion after the Inchon landing).4
The use of the past, however, is limited by contingency and context.
Projecting past experience to the future will likely be complicated by
major variations in technology, social organization, geopolitics, or other
elements that may have slight or no analog to the past. The relevance
or irrelevance of history to new challenges is an important element for
framing the context of expert judgment.
The past furnishes no precise formulas for solving present problems or
predicting the future. History does, however, provide the best possible
backdrop for putting strategic concepts in perspective before theoreticians
frame recommendations and decisionmakers fit them into plans.5

History, Psychology, and War

There is extensive literature on the historical value of case studies
and the psychological relevance of analogical reasoning. Observations
from several influential authors provide a firm foundation for
understanding the important interdisciplinary connections between
history and psychology.
Among Carl von Clausewitz’s keenest insights are the ones regarding
human psychology and emotion in war. As Clausewitz pointed out, “The
human mind . . . has a universal thirst for clarity, and longs to feel itself
part of an orderly scheme of things.” 6 Clausewitz rightly placed moral
and intellectual factors at the center of war and its remarkable trinity
of “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity . . . the play of chance and
probability . . . and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of
policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” 7
4      Khong, Analogies at War, 174–205, 97–147.
5      John M. Collins, “How Military Strategists Should Study History,” Military Review 63, no. 8
(August 1983): 44.
6      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 71.
7      Clausewitz, On War, 89.
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For Clausewitz, there was no way to understand war in the absence
of politics and genius. As Peter Paret notes, given the rudimentary
nature of psychology in Clausewitz’s time, he had a limited vocabulary
for it. Nonetheless, Clausewitz’s concept of genius captures much of
his analysis of the human mind: “Any complex activity, if it is to be
carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of
intellect and temperament. If they are outstanding and reveal themselves
in exceptional achievements, their possessor is called a ‘genius.’ ” 8
As Paret explains, “Genius served as [Clausewitz’s] favorite
analytic device to conceptualize the various abilities and feelings that
affected the behavior of more ordinary as well as of exceptional men.” 9
Among the appropriate gifts of intellect, Clausewitz put great store in
military history as a means for understanding war. To him, any theory
of war must meet practical standards of applicability in the real world.
Clausewitz’s chapters “Critical Analysis” and “On Historical Examples”
are excellent models for considering the appropriate use of history.
Clausewitz summarized four ways historical examples could be used:
“as an explanation of an idea,” “to show the application of an idea,”
“to support a statement,” and “the detailed presentation of a historical
event, and the combination of several events . . . to deduce a doctrine.”
If, however, some historical event is being presented in order to demonstrate
a general truth, care must be taken that every aspect bearing on the truth
at issue is fully and circumstantially developed—carefully assembled, so to
speak, before the reader’s eyes. To the extent that this cannot be done, the
proof is weakened, and the more necessary it will be to use a number of
cases to supply the evidence missing in that one. It is fair to assume that
where we cannot cite more precise details, the average effect will be decided
by a greater number of examples.10

In short, Clausewitz suggests the manner in which causes and effects
can be attributed to multiple cases strengthens the general theories of war
that can be deduced from historical examples. Furthermore, Clausewitz
cautions about the applicability of historical examples with respect to
the time that has elapsed since the particular event: “The further one
progresses from broad generalities to details, the less one is able to select
examples and experiences from remote times.” 11
Robert Jervis gives great attention to the sources of biases,
particularly those related to direct personal experience, and their pitfalls,
which can influence individual behaviors as well as international politics.
Discussing how decisionmakers learn from history, Jervis notes,
People pay most attention to what happens to them and to those they
identify with. . . . A person learns most from events that are experienced
firsthand, that influence his career, or that have major consequences for
his nation. This sample is idiosyncratically biased because of the accidental

8      Clausewitz, On War, 100.
9      Clausewitz, On War, 11.
10      Clausewitz, On War, 171–72.
11      Clausewitz, On War, 174.
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nature of what the person happens to experience firsthand or the fact that
one dramatic event rather than another occurs in his lifetime.12

Decisionmakers tend to focus on superficial aspects of historical
examples, particularly those that accord with preexisting biases and are
reinforced by society. The most powerful collective events that shape
individual perceptions are revolutions that establish or reshape a society
and the most recent major war.13
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May provide a superb analysis of the
uses and misuses of history.14 After highlighting major events shaped by
policymakers’ uses of history, such as success in the Cuban missile crisis
and problems while defending South Korea, Neustadt and May focus
on how decisionmakers can better use historical examples and vignettes.
Explicit in their work is the understanding that individual experience
is very influential. Their analysis captures the tension between using
history and the limitations imposed by reliance on individual experience.
Neustadt and May suggest several methods policymakers can
incorporate to use history more effectively. The methods are a good
starting point for establishing the relevance of historical analogies to
specific problems and understanding the circumstances for a decision,
to include known, unclear, and presumed elements. When individuals
apply principles of good journalism, they can figure out what the story is
rather than what the problem is. With this approach, analysts explore the
degree to which an historical example is similar to or different from the
contemporary circumstance to which it might be applied. The methods
help analysts avoid group biases or groupthink, give decisionmakers
pause to analyze responses, challenge prevailing assumptions, and avoid
the trap of superficial similarities, biases, and other common pitfalls that
can lead to premature or incomplete decisions.15
Yuen Foong Khong provides an even more constructive approach
with his analogical explanation framework that applies cognitive social
psychology to improve decision-making.16 Khong’s framework explains
the routine and predictable manner in which people use analogies to
address new phenomena or gaps in experience. He compellingly applies
this information to analyze major US escalation decisions early in the
Vietnam War to show how an intelligent group of decisionmakers framed
options using historical analogies related to the Munich Agreement and
the US intervention against communists during the Korean War. Senior
leaders arrived at problematic, at best, escalation decisions that flowed
from their flawed analogical diagnoses.

12      Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 235.
13      Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 262–70.
14      Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for DecisionMakers (New York: Free Press, 1986).
15      Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 234–36, 273–75.
16      Khong, Analogies at War, 19–46.
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Khong’s framework clarifies how analogies provide shortcuts to
help deal with complex situations and identifies six diagnostic tasks
analogies help perform for decision-making.
• Diagnosis and Prescription
•• Define the nature of the problem
•• Give policymakers a sense of the political stakes
•• Imply or suggest possible policy prescriptions
• Evaluation
•• Predicting chances of success
•• Assessing moral rightness
•• Warning of dangers17
Khong further explains the complex relationship between applying
history and psychology to decision-making: “The problem lies less with a
failure of intellect than with the psychological processes associated with
the way humans pick analogies and use them to process information.” 18
Humans have limited cognitive capacity and tend to take the easiest
paths to make judgments in conditions of uncertainly. Key elements
of this laziness or satisficing include an overreliance on the availability
of and the tendency to focus on superficial similarities between a
current situation and the historical experience in the decisionmaker’s
repertoire. Once chosen, the analogy tends to persist as a tool for topdown analysis. This perspective can also reinforce confirmation bias
that causes discrepant information to be discounted and for ambiguous
information to be more likely perceived as confirming existing beliefs
and preferences.19
Daniel Kahneman, often drawing on his collaboration with Amos
Tversky, provides an insightful corrective to the concept of rationality
that carries important implications for analogical analysis. Kahneman
provides a useful underlying context for understanding the human
impulse to find quick answers to new challenges among the repertoire
of experiences and analogies readily at hand. In Thinking Fast and Slow,
Kahneman lays out many biases and tendencies of fast thinking—often
conceived as intuitive, quick, and instinctual—and identifies how they
can often lead us astray. 20
Drawing insights from the field of behavioral economics,
Kahneman provides a persuasive approach to understand the manner
in which individuals make decisions. He distills his analysis to System
1 (fast, intuitive thinking) and System 2 (slow, deliberate thinking) and
highlights how readily individuals rely on fast thinking for most tasks.
The overwhelming propensity for fast thinking, which draws heavily on
biases and heuristics, challenges assumptions of rational decision-making
17      Khong, Analogies at War, 10, 20–21.
18      Khong, Analogies at War, 14–15.
19      Khong, Analogies at War, 14–15, 43–45.
20      Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
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grounded in slow thinking. Indeed, slow thinking frequently rationalizes
the results of fast thinking rather than investigating alternatives.21
When we think of ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious,
reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think
about and what to do. Although System 2 believes itself to be where the
action is, the automatic System 1 is the hero. . . . System 1 . . . effortlessly
originat[es] impressions and feelings that are the main sources of the explicit
beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2.22

With respect to historical analogies, it is thus very likely that
individuals use intuition heavily conditioned by past experience to make
a decision before looking for analogies that support their decision, and
then fall prey to confirmation bias that prevents them from searching
for other perspectives or being open to other analogies.
Conditioned to think fast first, individuals tend to pillage a grab bag
of possible solutions from among which they often settle for the first and
most easily accessible (the availability heuristic). It is important and natural
for people to make these snap judgments in the blink of an eye as a basic
coping mechanism for moving through life. Nevertheless, it is possible
to induce slow thinking to work deliberately through possibilities and
alternatives that the mind might not select in a rush for quick answers.
The selection of specific historical analogies, which is often done poorly,
is mainly a function of default, fast thinking approaches that help
everyone cope with day-to-day living. Such psychological defaults or
short cuts are even more attractive in stressful situations characterized
by information overload and tight deadlines common for high-pressure
decision-making. This element helps explain why individuals frequently
fail to thoroughly weigh costs and benefits against valued ends when
making major decisions.
Circling back to Clausewitz’s foundational analysis, we benefit from
his placement of individual genius at the center of his theory of war.
Even without a scientific understanding of the influence of psychology
or genius on war, Clausewitz came close to the matter with the language
and frameworks he had at hand. He captured the essence of slow
thinking and the dangers of fast thinking in his numerous exhortations
for commanders to ignore first reports and emotional stimuli that
often come from the realm of battle and to stick with the convictions
developed more rationally and coolly. This sense of the importance of
psychology and history is one of the many reasons On War continues to
resonate. Jervis, Neustadt and May, Khong, and Kahneman offer useful
complements for understanding how history and experience inform
discretionary judgment.
To summarize, reasoning by analogy is natural and useful for
understanding the dynamic between history, psychology, and war.
But the misuses of history for which decisionmakers are faulted
are more predictable and inevitable than most of us would like to
21      Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 13, 415.
22      Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 21.
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imagine. Humans are predisposed to time-saving and psychologically
comfortable shortcuts to make sense of complexity and unfamiliarity as
quickly as possible. Once chosen, analogies persistently tend to influence
analysis and diagnosis of the circumstance to which they are applied.
Understanding the psychological habits that make analogies attractive is
fundamental to exploring their effective employment in PME.

Educating for Judgment

Individuals will use analogies to make professional judgments, and
as the literature above suggests, they are prone to do so poorly. Thus,
practitioners and scholars should remain attentive to the implications
of misusing history, especially when making national security policy
decisions. It is wise to be as self-aware as possible (individually and
organizationally) to mitigate the poor use of analogies. As Khong notes,
analyzing analogies, especially their similarities and differences, is more
problematic in international affairs where the context is less familiar
and generally less accessible. A major challenge is to figure out how to
improve upon or at least to mitigate the negative aspects of reasoning
by historical analogy.
Education can provide critical elements for understanding,
prioritizing, and selecting analogies. Individuals can use this information
to build a rich repertoire of professionally relevant history for nesting
their experience and analogies. With a solid framework and a habit of
exploring the elaborate texture of historical cases, individuals will be less
likely to rely on simple or superficial analogies for important decisions.
Short of actual war, simulating or replicating the key dynamics
of war is valuable to preparing leaders—civilian and military—for
the situations they might face in war. Wargames, case studies, reading
assignments, and other forms of study are among the useful techniques
for exploring the thought processes, strategic choices, and interactive
dynamics of war necessary for developing potentially useful analogies.
Historical case studies remain exceptionally valuable techniques for
educating national security professionals for the same reasons business
case studies are effective:
The case method creates a large repertoire of secondhand experiences from
which students can reason. . . . Students will seldom, if ever, encounter a
situation exactly like one they discussed in the classroom. But having studied
and debated hundreds of cases from diverse settings, [they] can draw upon
a large set of vicarious experiences as they make choices.23

Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, for example, is a
widely used source for exploring strategic choices in war and develops
potentially useful analogies regarding international power dynamics
(the rise of Athenian power and the fear induced in Sparta), strategic
overreach (the Sicilian Expedition), and other strategy and policy
23      Giovanni Gavetti and Jan W. Rivkin, “How Strategists Really Think: Tapping the Power of
Analogy,” Harvard Business Review, April 2005, 54–63.
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connections (domestic political will, treatment of allies, war termination,
and morality).24 Students, particularly broadly experienced and mature
midcareer practitioners, arrive with a repertoire of analogies distilled
from personal experiences and previous education. Professional military
education can help students develop self-awareness about the power and
pitfalls of analogies as well as introduce other perspectives that enrich
existing sources of or create new sources for analogical thinking.
Three threads of advanced education converge in important ways.
First, individuals are predisposed to draw upon their own experience as
a basis for analogizing and implicitly theorizing about cause and effect
with respect to new phenomenon. Second, members of groups are able
to communicate with one another, often in abbreviated fashion, using
analogies or other references to key events that are often freighted with
supposedly, collectively agreed upon lessons. Third, education develops
valuable individual and collective historical repertoires for future use.
In war, stakes are especially profound and personal experiences
are particularly acute. Moreover, the infrequency of such experiences
in a typical individual’s career heightens the importance of educational
opportunities to analyze other historical experiences rationally.
Education should also include endeavors that increase individuals’ selfawareness about the pitfalls of analogical thinking and to emphasize
team thinking to get candid feedback on chosen analogies. Leaders need
to learn to ask important questions about analogies, to include the first
order question, Is this a good analogy?
In the development of an analogy to explain the past, organize
disparate information, and inform future assessments, institutions
like the armed forces have advantages in framing and promulgating
understanding of particular historical analogies in ways that can have
important bearing on civil-military relations—for example, in the wake
of the Vietnam War, many members of the armed forces, particularly
those in the Army, developed an explanation for the tragedy that blamed
civilian leaders.25 As specious as the argument proves when subjected
to rigorous examination, the result was a version of analogical thinking
that connected civilian micromanagement to strategic failure. Hence,
civilian micromanagement of military operations in contemporary or
future conflicts could lead to Vietnam-like strategic failure.26 Education
should play an important role in helping students to analyze such claims
more thoroughly.

24      Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War
(New York: The Free Press, 1996).
25      William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 86, 414;
and Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1982),
57–58, 245–47.
26      Eliot A. Cohen, “Enough Blame To Go Around,” National Interest, March 1, 1998.
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Conclusion

Field Marshal Viscount William Slim, one of the military giants
of World War II, provides wise counsel regarding the pitfalls of using
history as a predictor, rather than a foreshadowing, of events:
Generals have often been reproached with preparing for the last war instead
of for the next—an easy gibe when their fellow-countrymen and their
political leaders, too frequently, have prepared for no war at all. Preparation
for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet there is one important
part of it that costs little—study. However changed and strange the new
conditions of war may be, not only generals, but politicians and ordinary
citizens, may find there is much to be learned from the past that can be
applied to the future and, in their search for it, that some campaigns have
more than others foreshadowed the coming pattern of modern war.27

Individuals will always employ history of one kind or another. The
challenge is to ensure strategists and decisionmakers deploy history as
well as possible.
In addition to using historical analogies well, professionals must be
mindful of how the natural and routine oversimplification and adoption
of preferred versions of historical logic can affect the development of
strategy and policy—similar to the dysfunctional ways that preferred
military analogies about excessive civilian micromanagement in the
Vietnam War negatively affected subsequent US civil-military relations.
After more than 17 years of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, an important
test for professional military education will be to conscientiously consider
how students’ recent experiences may influence analyses, diagnoses, and
prescriptions for other missions.
History provides an invaluable and inescapable foundation upon
which to build future national security policy. The inevitable use of
historical analogies demands continued attention from scholars and
national security professionals. The professional challenge is to use
analogies that are developed as fully as possible and to be mindful of
the limitations of human habit and reasoning that make analogies an
imperfect tool for diagnosis and prescription in security affairs.

27      Viscount William Joseph Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945
(New York: Cooper Square, 2000), 535.

